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Abstract
This article argues that to better understand involvement in terrorism, research needs to focus on why most 
extremists will never actually commit such violence. It starts from the premise that involvement in terrorist 
violence is an unlikely outcome of radicalization processes. The dramatic and violent nature of terrorist attacks 
can obscure the fact that most individuals who adopt extremist views will refrain from acting in support of their 
convictions altogether, or do so in essentially non-violent ways such as through fundraising or the dissemination 
of propaganda. The norm of non-involvement in terrorist violence among people radicalized to extremism, offers 
considerable opportunities for new research directions. This article begins by expanding on why non-involvement 
in terrorist violence deserves more attention from researchers. It then discusses insights within and beyond the field 
of terrorism studies that can help explain the differences between violent and non-violent radicalization outcomes. 
The discussion then turns to some methodological considerations relevant to obtaining a better understanding of 
non-involvement in terrorist violence among radicalized individuals.
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Introduction
Terrorism is communication through extreme violence, purposefully bloody theatre in which murder is less 
the principal aim than the means used to draw attention to a cause, a group, or a grievance.[1] In the post-
1945 period, non-state terrorists have often succeeded in forcefully grabbing the attention of citizens and 
governments, even if they seldom achieve the goals they pursue.[2] It has become a cliché to point out that, as a 
cause of death in Western societies, terrorism ranks far below the more mundane risks posed by traffic, ladders 
and bathtubs.[3] Other forms of violence, such as domestic abuse and homicide, are far more widespread 
yet receive a fraction of the attention that politicians and the media allocate to terrorism.[4] At least in part, 
contemporary terrorism’s outsized societal impact stems from the premeditated use of extreme violence, the 
explicit targeting of civilians and noncombatants and its often purposefully indiscriminate nature. Anyone who 
represents a broadly defined category of enemies could be a victim and these characteristics imbue terrorism 
with an ability to simultaneously shock and enrage that ensures it grabs the attention of citizens, politicians 
and academics.
The gruesome spectacle of terrorist violence invariably draws attention to its perpetrators. Their motives, 
backgrounds, and personal characteristics have attracted significant scholarly interest since academic research 
on terrorism emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.[5] An early line of work suggested that terrorists were driven 
to violence by psychiatric conditions such as psychopathy and narcissism.[6] Other such research emphasized 
developmental issues, suggesting some terrorists externalized deep-seated conflicts with their parents or an 
inability to live up to societal expectations.[7] Although these findings correspond to the popular view of 
terrorists as deranged or damaged individuals,[8] they quickly attracted criticism on methodological and 
empirical grounds.[9] As the study of terrorism grew exponentially in the years following 9/11,[10] much of 
this early work was criticized, leading to a thesis of terrorists’ psychological ‘normality’ that has itself recently 
come under scrutiny for lack of nuance.[11] Over the past two decades, the search for causes of terrorism 
has broadened significantly beyond the individual level of analysis, with researchers considering group and 
structural-level influences as well.[12]
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Following jihadist terrorist attacks in Madrid, Amsterdam and London in the early 2000s, ‘radicalization’ 
emerged as the master narrative for understanding the process leading to involvement in terrorism, among 
academics as well as broader society.[13] The term has stuck, despite uncertainty over its exact meaning and 
ongoing discussions about whether or not it overemphasizes the role of ideological convictions among the 
dozens of other potentially relevant variables.[14] In this article, the term radicalization refers to the varied 
processes that can lead people to participate in radical, extremist or terrorist groups or movements. Its use 
here is thus not limited to the cognitive interpretation of radicalization that sees it as the adoption of ever 
more radical, and ultimately extremist, ideological convictions. This broader understanding of radicalization 
acknowledges that involvement processes are as likely to be driven by a personal search for meaning, belonging, 
or adventure as they are to be (solely) guided by convictions.[15] Indeed, actual ideological radicalization 
may follow rather than precede involvement in radical or extremist groups or movements, underlining the 
importance of looking beyond ideology.[16]
A distinction is also made between radicalism and extremism. Here, the former refers to views and movements 
that seek far-reaching political or societal change but usually pursue these goals in a non-violent fashion and 
while remaining by-and-large within the confines set by democratic governance and the rule of law.[17] By 
contrast, extremism refers to convictions that seek not just change but revolution and (or) explicitly advocate 
the use of violent means to achieve desired outcomes.[18] One of the downsides of radicalization as a concept 
is that it implicitly ties radicalism to terrorism, rendering suspect movements and ideas that challenge the 
status quo in a vocal and perhaps confrontational but usually peaceful manner. As this article goes on to argue, 
the trajectory from radicalism to terrorism is far less common than is often assumed. To minimize confusion, 
the phrase ‘radicalization to extremism’ is used here to clarify the focus on people and movements explicitly in 
favor of the use of violence. 
Fortunately, as the field of terrorism studies matured in recent years, so has radicalization as a concept and our 
thinking about the factors thought to underlie such processes. Overly reductionist understandings of terrorism 
stemming from ‘root causes’ such as poverty or lack of education, the notion that terrorists share particular 
‘profiles’,[19] and the idea that involvement processes are linear and deterministic, have largely been abandoned.
[20] Increased use of primary data has provided the greater detail and reliability needed to assess existing 
explanations for radicalization and develop new ones.[21] Mental health issues have received renewed and 
more nuanced consideration.[22] Yet, despite this progress, and despite the attention that terrorism continues 
to demand as a societal threat, our ability to explain how and why people become involved in it, other than 
retrospectively on a case-by-case basis, remains limited.
One of the key challenges remains understanding why the majority of people who radicalize to extremism never 
come to participate in the planning, preparation or commission of terrorist attacks.[23] The extreme violence at 
the heart of terrorism and its ability to have long-lasting adverse effects on societies, naturally draws attention 
to those who wield it. But for every person who committed terrorist violence on behalf of al-Qaeda, the IRA 
or the National Socialist Underground, hundreds if not thousands of others did not, despite sharing similarly 
extremist worldviews, peer groups and comparable socioeconomic backgrounds.[24] Unlike the literatures on 
civil war and insurgencies, terrorism studies has spent relatively little attention on this variation of the ‘collective 
action problem’.[25] It is still largely unclear why most people who radicalize to extremism are content to 
‘freeride’ on the violent militancy committed by a small group of their ideological compatriots.[26] By focusing 
predominantly on cases of radicalization leading to terrorist violence and underemphasizing those where it did 
not, the field has struggled to make sense of a key distinction in the outcome of radicalization processes.[27] 
This not only hampers our ability to isolate the most relevant factors for understanding involvement in terrorist 
violence, it also limits our knowledge of the protective factors that may keep those who radicalize to extremism 
from crossing this ultimate threshold.
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Challenges to Understanding Non-Involvement in Terrorist Violence
A core issue that many attempts to understand involvement in terrorist violence face, is that they have done so 
by selecting on the dependent variable. In other words, trying to explain why people commit terrorist attacks 
by studying only the perpetrators of such attacks. Of course, analyses of those at the sharp end of radicalization 
have much to offer and have yielded a range of relevant insights.[28] But trying to understand involvement in 
terrorist violence by looking only at actual perpetrators of such crimes obscures exactly those counter-examples 
of non-violent radicalization necessary to bring to light what sets both apart in terms of personal background 
characteristics, involvement-process dynamics and the influence of group as well as structural-level variables.
[29] Within the set of individuals who radicalize to extremism, what sets apart those who engage in terrorist 
violence from those who do not?
As a result of this overemphasis on perpetrators of terrorist violence, existing explanations for involvement 
in terrorism, as well as risk assessment tools intended to help practitioners detect and prevent terrorism and 
radicalization to extremism, suffer from a specificity problem.[30] This is the challenge of explaining why, 
for instance, only one or two members of extremist groups will actually turn to terrorist violence, despite the 
characteristics of these individuals’ backgrounds and involvement dynamics being shared by a much larger 
portion of group members.[31] The specificity problem is what makes it unwise to rely on ‘root causes’ such 
as poverty or discrimination, as there will always be many more individuals who did not turn to extremism, 
let alone actual terrorism, despite exposure to similar conditions.[32] It is at the heart of the problem with 
interpretations of radicalization that see the adoption of increasingly extremist convictions as leading to 
terrorist violence, because there will always be many more people who espouse extremist views without acting 
on them.[33]
Tackling the specificity problem is key to a better understanding of the differences between violent and non-
violent radicalization outcomes. To do so, three specific challenges need to be overcome. The first of these 
concerns how radicalization and involvement in terrorism are conceptualized.[34] As several authors have 
argued, radicalizing to extremism and actually engaging in terrorist violence are two related but separate 
processes that need to be – but have often not been – explained independently.[35] Radicalization is not 
predetermined to lead to extremism, let alone involvement in terrorism or other forms of political violence.
[36] Many people who radicalize will not go beyond the adoption of radical points of view (i.e. usually non-
violent and seeking change but not revolution). Similarly, participation in non-violent activism, such as 
demonstrations or attempts to gain political influence through electoral politics, seem far more likely outcomes 
than involvement in terrorism. Moreover, for a considerable number of people who radicalize, radical or 
extremist ideologies’ attraction is not so much their use as a blueprint for collective action, but as a source of 
individual and group identity.[37] Their goal is not to ‘do something’ but to ‘be someone’, underscoring that 
radicalization may be as much about meaning-making as it is about achieving political or social change. 
Just as radicalization processes are better seen as having a multitude of possible outcomes than simply 
propelling people towards terrorism, so too should those outcomes themselves be disaggregated. While 
involvement in terrorism is often conflated with the execution of terrorist attacks, this is actually only one 
of several ‘organizational roles’ available.[38] Terrorist organizations or cells are likely to have as many if not 
more individuals in non-violent ‘support’ positions related to logistics, recruitment, propaganda or finances. 
There are also likely to be participants who are best classified as simple ‘hangers-on’ with limited interest in 
actually doing anything. Acknowledging the multi-finality of radicalization outcomes and the numerous forms 
that involvement in terrorism can take, is a first step towards a better understanding of what combinations of 
personal background factors and radicalization-process dynamics shape the key distinction between violent 
and non-violent outcomes.[39] While there has been a promising push towards disaggregating what it means 
to be radicalized or involved in terrorism, this research direction deserves to gain more traction in the years to 
come.[40]
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A closely related second issue standing in the way of a better understanding of why most people who radicalize 
to extremism will not actually become involved in terrorism, is the dearth of comparative research designs 
within terrorism studies.[41] While more carefully conceptualizing the different forms that radicalization and 
involvement in terrorism can take is a crucial first step, explaining those differences will require a range of 
comparative studies to be undertaken. There is plenty of potential. For instance, by studying broad differences 
in radicalization outcomes, such as between those individuals who become involved in violent extremism 
in some shape or form (i.e. as recruiters, propagandists, violence users, etc.) and those who do not. It would 
also be fascinating to further develop work that teases apart role adoption or allocation within extremist and 
terrorist groups to better understand why some persons will, for instance, advocate political violence but not 
use it themselves.[42] Key insights may also be gained from making comparisons between different forms 
of violent extremist movements. Why, for instance, does the long-term trend among European right-wing 
extremists show a decline in the use of deadly violence while the opposite is true in the United States for the 
2000s and 2010s?[43] While comparative research designs are not entirely absent from terrorism studies, their 
potential has hardly begun to be utilized.[44]
Carrying out such comparisons effectively means surmounting a third challenge. Like participation in other 
forms of crime, radicalization pathways and terrorist-involvement patterns will be characterized by specific 
combinations of both risk and protective factors.[45] The partial mitigation of risk factors by protective factors 
may be an important explanation why only some people within an extremist organization will actually turn 
convictions into violence. In recent years we have begun to see protective factors feature more prominently 
in research on terrorism and radicalization, although to different degrees.[46] At the same time, the literature 
points to ongoing issues with the limited empirical validation of both risk and protective factors.[47] It also 
conveys a sense that much more work needs to be done to maximize our understanding of the role that protective 
factors play in accounting for different radicalization outcomes and role-adoption patterns in terrorist groups.
[48] Studying users of terrorist violence and the risk factors associated with their behavior has certainly proven 
useful, yet further progress may depend on coming at this problem from a still largely unexplored angle. What 
keeps most extremists from engaging in the terrorist violence that they support in words but not deeds? Can 
attention for protective as well as risk factors help explain such non-involvement in terrorist violence?
A Multidisciplinary Perspective on Risk and Protective Factors
Studying extremists’ non-involvement in terrorist violence does not have to start from scratch. There is 
increasing attention within terrorism studies for this subject, and a large body of work in adjacent disciplines 
that can offer useful insights. The growing number of studies on protective factors for terrorism point to a 
range of elements, including the importance of family and friends who are not involved in extremism, having 
numerous social contacts, having family obligations, older age, apathy or the sense that change is not possible, 
the presence of non-violent alternatives for pursuing change, perceived strategic ineffectiveness of terrorism, a 
measured government response to protest, and fear of the personal costs of militancy (e.g. arrest, death, loss of 
income).[49] Others note the protective influence of a stable employment history, the importance of pro-social 
support systems such as school, and the risk-attenuating effects of a stable upbringing in which parents provide 
both affection and active involvement in a child’s development.[50] Research also underlines the importance 
of self-esteem, the ability to empathize with others, interacting with diverse groups of people, and the ability 
to deal with ambiguity.[51] Notable is the emphasis given to the dampening influence of high self-control.[52]
These examples (see [53] for more complete overviews) illustrate that protective factors can take a variety of 
forms. Some relate to individual characteristics such as age and cognitive style, others stem from upbringing, 
social networks and systemic elements such as opportunities for achieving change through non-violent 
means. Complementing this empirically-oriented work are a number of more theoretical contributions, such 
as Dutter’s argument that the ‘non-development of an ethos of political violence or armed struggle’ was an 
important element limiting the development of separatist terrorism in Quebec.[54] The importance of looking 
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at the internal dynamics of protest movements, rebellions and terrorist groups is underlined by Busher et al., 
who propose several internal brakes on violent escalation that include seeing violence as morally indefensible 
or strategically ineffective.[55] Clearly, risk and protective factors for terrorist violence are not just found at an 
individual level, but may also be present within the group or broader movement in which people radicalized 
to extremism come to participate.[56] Turning to terrorist violence or not may depend on what type of 
organization or movement is joined and whether an individual is subsequently socialized to see violence as 
effective and justified or not.[57]
Beyond this terrorism-specific literature, there are years of relevant scholarship in adjacent disciplines such 
as criminology and psychology. Criminologists in particular have long been studying how various kinds of 
protective factors impact an individual’s likelihood of engaging in delinquent behavior in the short and long-
term.[58] Beyond a wealth of empirical work on risk and protective factors, the discipline also offers a useful 
conceptual distinction between a promotive factor as ‘a variable that [predicts] a low probability of offending’ 
and a protective factor as ‘a variable that interacts with a risk factor to nullify its effect’.[59] The first may be 
most relevant to understanding how and why certain people are more likely to be attracted to extremism 
while the latter may have more to say about assessing the likelihood of turning to terrorist violence among 
those already radicalized to extremism. Longitudinal studies have been quite consistent in pointing to the 
promotive effects of a stable home life, commitment to school, pro-social peers et cetera.[60] Similarly, work 
on criminal gangs notes that the risks of involvement are lower for young people with strong familial ties.[61] 
Another relevant insight from criminology is that risk factors can be stacked, thus increasing the likelihood of 
delinquent behavior and, arguably, diminishing the mitigating influences of any protective factors in place.[62]
Criminology clearly has much to offer for the study of (non-)involvement in terrorist violence.[63] The 
same applies to work on involvement processes and the dynamics governing the use of violence in related 
phenomena, such as civil wars, criminal gangs, (youth) violence more generally, the military, and the gender-
dynamics present across these domains.[64] There is much to be gained by looking beyond the boundaries set 
by terrorism studies’ core journals, but a broad approach to the literature is no panacea. Despite the greater 
attention given to the role of protective factors in criminology, that discipline also appears to have favored a 
risk-factor based approach until relatively recently, particularly in areas relevant to the study of terrorism such 
as forensic medicine and risk assessment.[65] Especially for those protective factors (and certainly also risk 
factors) beginning to be linked to radicalization to extremism and involvement in terrorist violence, it needs 
to be remembered that many lack strong empirical validation.[66] Hence the divergent conclusions reached 
about, for instance, the relationship between religiosity and radicalization to extremism or the role of strong 
social ties.[67] While adjacent fields and topics of study have much to offer research on (non-) involvement in 
terrorism, there are few ready-made answers to be found.
Methodological Considerations
There are several methodological issues to keep in mind when researching non-involvement in terrorism 
among individuals radicalized to extremism. The first of these is finding and accessing sufficiently detailed 
biographical information. While perpetrators of deadly terrorist attacks often become the subjects of detailed 
case studies and extensive reporting (e.g. Anders Breivik), there is little publicly available information on 
extremists who did not engage in terrorism. Requesting access to police information or applying for permission 
to interview persons convicted of non-violent terrorism-related offenses are certainly alternatives, but distinctly 
time-consuming ones. Fortunately, there are numerous (auto-)biographies of former extremists and a growing 
number of ‘formers’ who may be suitable as interviewees and whose public profiles make them easy to find. 
Although extremists who did not become involved in terrorism will be more difficult to locate, the fact that 
they did not commit such crimes, and have probably not been exposed to much media attention previously, 
will likely make them more willing to work with researchers. Another possibility here is to prioritize historical 
cases, in the sense of ones that have progressed through the courts and concern people or movements no 
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longer at the forefront of militancy, as this is likely to make access to material and interviewees easier, and has 
the added benefit of addressing the field’s overwhelming focus on contemporary issues and developments.[68]
Another option is to focus on individuals prosecuted as members of terrorist organizations but who did 
not actually contribute to the planning, preparation or execution of an actual attack. In theory, it should be 
relatively straightforward to distinguish between violence users and, for instance, recruiters or propagandists. 
In practice, the boundaries between various roles are often blurred, especially within groups with ambiguous 
organizational structures.[69] Another difficulty here is that preemptive arrests always leave a degree of 
uncertainty as to whether those individuals who seemed intent to carry out attacks would actually have done 
so, especially as bragging and fantasizing about violence is a common feature in extremist groups. A solution 
here would be to operationalize Taylor and Horgan’s distinction between involvement and event decisions.[70] 
For example, while all participants in terrorist groups have made involvement decisions, to qualify as having 
made an event decision (i.e. a decision to engage in terrorist violence) participants need to have demonstrated 
clear intent, involvement in planning and preparatory activities (e.g. target selection, logistics) and access to 
weapons. Such an approach certainly won’t remove all ambiguity from the distinction between those involved 
in terrorist violence and those who are not. But it can provide a basis for broadening case selection of people 
in the ‘involved in terrorist violence’ category beyond those caught red-handed on their way to carry out an 
attack, which will always be a relatively small group.
Alongside acquiring relevant data, there is the question of how to assess it. Although biographical information 
will be essential to piece together radicalization processes and involvement trajectories, it is vital to broaden the 
analysis beyond the individual him- or herself. As Bouhana argues, terrorism is something that people do but it 
cannot be explained simply by looking at individuals; the (physical) context and its myriad influences must be 
considered as well.[71] A better grasp of (non-) involvement in terrorist violence requires the use of multiple 
analytical perspectives, including the structural (e.g. socio-economic and (geo)political context), the group or 
movement level (e.g. socialization processes, role of peer pressures) and the individual level of analysis (e.g. 
grievances, ideological conviction, views on utility of violence).[72] 
Another aspect to keep in mind here, is the importance of taking a longitudinal perspective on the influence 
that these various factors exert on radicalization and involvement processes. That is, not to take a snapshot of, 
for instance, terrorists at the moment they were arrested, but to consider how present behavior was shaped 
by past influences, especially as research shows risk factors are liable to ‘stack’ over time and persist even if 
the original cause has abated (e.g. victims of childhood abuse are likely to experience its effects long after the 
abuse itself has ended).[73] Such a process-oriented analysis is key to identifying changes in the configuration 
of risk and protective factors that characterize violent and non-violent outcomes of radicalization processes. 
It may well be that what sets perpetrators of terrorist violence apart is not a greater number of risk factors, 
but the disappearance of protective influences over time. Attention for the dynamic nature of radicalization 
and involvement processes will be crucial to gaining greater clarity on what distinguishes those who become 
involved in terrorist violence from the majority of extremists that does not.
Conclusion
This article has argued that a better understanding of why and how some people become involved in terrorist 
violence requires this question to be flipped on its head. By studying what keeps the majority of people who 
radicalize to extremism from involvement in terrorist attacks, the academic community stands to make 
significant progress on a subject that has been at the heart of the field’s debates for decades. Fortunately, the 
multi-finality of radicalization outcomes, and the various forms that involvement in terrorism can take, has 
already begun to draw researchers’ attention. Likewise, there is an uptick in comparative studies and greater 
attention for the influence exerted by protective as well as risk factors. While there is clearly a significant way 
to go before the field’s specificity problem has been adequately addressed, that is the tendency to understand 
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involvement in terrorist violence by only studying actual perpetrators of such attacks, it seems warranted to 
expect research projects undertaken in this area to yield important contributions in the years to come.
Exploring what sets apart radicalization trajectories that lead to involvement in terrorist violence from those 
that do not, has clear benefits for the work of counterterrorism policymakers and practitioners as well. Clearer 
insights into the protective factors that may dissuade participation in this form of political violence can 
empower prevention work and help curb recidivism among those convicted of terrorism-related offenses.[74] 
The corollary is a clearer picture of the background factors and involvement dynamics more likely to apply to 
those who do turn to terrorist violence. This type of information will be beneficial to police and intelligence 
agencies working to detect and prevent terrorist plots from reaching maturity - agencies which will often need 
to identify the most high-risk individuals within a larger group of suspects.[75] Given this potential, studying 
non-involvement in terrorist violence may be one of the most promising ways of pushing the boundaries of 
knowledge on a form of political violence that has given few signs of abating as a significant societal threat.
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